<Articles>The Term "Symbolic Emperor [System]" and the Process of its Adoption

本稿は従来の研究が見落としてきた「象徴天皇制」という用語それ自体の由来を、憲法論を四期に分けて検証することで解明する。第一期は新憲法制定直後であり、この時期は君主制が維持されたのか否かが議論の中心で、象徴という言葉自体がまだ定着していなかった。第二期は一九五二年の解散権論争を契機として、象徴の権能に注目が集まった。憲法学界の大勢は新憲法を共和制に引きつけて解釈する方向に進み、天皇の無力性を強調する言葉として「象徴天皇」の語が出るようになった。第三期は一九五四年に保守政党が相次いで発表した改憲構想に憲法学界が批判を寄せ、天皇元首化に反対する立場から「元首でない天皇」という文脈で「象徴天皇」の語が広まっていった。第四期は内閣憲法調査会の活動期で、保守勢力が象徴を元首と解釈することを条件に「象徴天皇制」を受容した。かくして一九六〇年代初頭に門象徴天皇制制は統一的定義を与えられないままに定着するのである。This paper aims to clarify the process of the adoption of shocho tenno [sei], "symbolic emperor [system], " in Japan, by focusing on how the term itself took root. After the promulgation of the Constitution of Japan, arguments among constitutional scholars about the Emperor under the Constitution went through four stages. In the first stage lasting a few years after the promulgation, discussions among constitutional scholars focused on whether the Emperor was a sovereign, kunshu, or not. The term "the symbolic emperor system" had not yet taken root. In the following stage, scholars paid more attention to the question of the authority of the Emperor. It so happened that at this time, the Yoshida Shigeru cabinet was faced the problem of the dissolution of the House of Representatives. This was a turning point, and scholars began to argue whether the dissolution based on Article 7 was constitutional. Most scholars saw that, even under the Constitution of Japan, there was a possibility that the Emperor could be interpreted as sovereign. They did not like this prospect and grew cautious. It was at this stage that use of the term "symbolic emperor [system]" first came to be adopted (but Without a clear definition). In the following, third stage, the scholars re-acted against the conservatives who published plans to revise the Constitution. The conservatives claimed that the Emperor should be the head of state, genshu. Their argument was based on two principles : the Emperor should represent Japan in international society and he should have more authority within the country. However, the scholars who opposed this idea started to use the term "symbolic emperor system" openly to imply that the Emperor was not the head of state. They regarded the Constitution not as a final goal but as a product in the process of Japan's democratization. Thus, for those scholars, the "symbolic emperor system" marked a point of compromise with what was deemed "old-fashioned thinking." They did not value the term "symbolic emperor system" highly. So they made no effort to definite it positively. The fourth stage was the period following the formation and operation of the Cabinet Research Commission on the Constitution. The socialists were quick to adopt the term "symbolic emperor system, " which had been used primarily by the scholars. In the early 1960s, even ordinary people began to use the term. People had the impression that this term referred to an emperor with limited authority. The conservatives in effect also succeeded in positioning the Emperor as sovereign under Article 1 of the Constitution. They accumulated practical and conventional instances of the use of the Constitution since the time of the Yoshida government. Recognizing that the distribution of seats in the Diet made it impossible for the conservatives to revise the Constitution, the Ikeda Hayato cabinet, in particular, avoided any revision of the Constitution or other laws that might have created sharp conflicts between the governing party and the opposition. Instead, his cabinet pressed for a realistic policy, applying the Constitution according to the circumstances at hand. The conservatives gained confidence by the fact that international society in effect recognized the Emperor as the head of state. They felt that this was sufficient, and they too accepted the term "symbolic emperor system." However, the conservatives accepted the term on the condition that the symbolic emperor should be interpreted as head of state. If the manner in which the term came to be used is taken into consideration, this interpretation must be understood as incorrect. They had wanted to revise the Constitution in order to declare the Emperor the head of state precisely because they did not believe that the Emperor was head of state under the Constitution. The circumstances were unfavorable to the conservatives. The tide of public opinion had turned against revision of the Constitution. All the conservatives were, therefore, compelled to interpret the symbolic emperor as head of state. However, the socialists did not accept this interpretation, either. Neither the conservatives nor the socialists would work together to reach a compromise. To this day scholars have failed to find an answer to the question whether the symbolic emperor is the head of state, or not. The term "symbolic emperor [system]" continues to be used today without any clear definition